Danisname Beşeri ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

Öz

In this article, the relation between existence and quiddity, which is an important issue in Islamic metaphysical thought, will be discussed in a comparative method within the framework of al-Suhrawardī's (d. 587/1191) Hikmat al-Ishrāq and the commentaries written on it by al-Shahrazūrī and Qutbeddīn al-Shīrāzī. Suhrawardī's doctrine of wisdom, in which he adopted the method of discovery and intuition, gained continuity after him through the commentaries written on his works and the references to his views. In his works, the philosopher both criticized the Peripatetic philosophical tradition and established his own ontological and epistemological system by making use of it. In his ontological system presented in his work Hikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī prefers the term "nūr" instead of Avicenna's "mawjūd" and "Nūr al-anwār" instead of "Wājib al-wujūd". However, Suhrawardī states that concepts such as wujūd, quiddity, thing, and truth in Avicenna's philosophy are intellectual credentials. Shahrazūrī and al-Shīrāzī, the commentators of Hikmat al-Ishrāq, also state that concepts such as existence, quiddity, and truth are intellectual reputations, even though they use Avicennan terminology. Similarly, the concepts of unity (wahdat), possibility, and necessity are intellectual predicates. This is because, according to these thinkers belonging to the Illuminationist tradition, when these concepts are taken as absolute, their attribution to different individuals is realized in equal ways. Moreover, unlike Avicenna, the philosophers of Illuminationism agree that existence can only be realized in the mental plane. It is seen that both al-Suhrawardī and his commentators accept quiddity as essential and fundamental. This is because one can talk about the concept of existence (wujūd) in terms of quiddity. Avicenna's view that possibility is a necessity of quiddity, Suhrawardī criticizes possibility as an accident for quiddity. According to Suhrawardī, possibility is an accident with which quiddity is characterized. Possibility is not something that exists by its own essence, nor is it necessary existence. This is because the concept of necessary is contingent like existence and possibility. According to Suhrawardī, there is no distinction between existence and essence in God, who is the Light of Light. However, in beings other than Him, there is a distinction of existence and essence only in the mental plan.